The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law: Problems Arising in a Criminal Proceeding by Barbarowicz, Robert P.
Volume 74 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 74, 
1969-1970 
1-1-1970 
The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law: Problems Arising in a 
Criminal Proceeding 
Robert P. Barbarowicz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Robert P. Barbarowicz, The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law: Problems Arising in a Criminal 
Proceeding, 74 DICK. L. REV. 219 (1970). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol74/iss2/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Comments
THE PENNSYLVANIA IMPLIED CONSENT LAW:
PROBLEMS ARISING IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
Since the advent of the automobile at the turn of the century,
an estimated 1.5 million persons have died as a result of automobile
accidents.' The "drunk driver" has been found responsible for
over half of approximately 53,000 highway deaths2 and a large per-
centage of the 14 million minor automobile accidents in the United
States each year. 3 In apparent response to the continuing massa-
cre on the highways of the Commonwealth 4 and federal standards
requiring better highway safety programs,5 Pennsylvania has
joined a growing number of states enacting legislation to combat
the deadly menace of the "drunk driver."6  On July 31, 1968, the
1. H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1966).
2. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 90TH CONG., 2d SESS.,
ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT 14-15 (Comm. Print 1968).
3. Id.
4. In 1966, 2180 rersons died in automobile accidents on Pennsyl-
vania roads. For a complete analysis of automobile accidents and fatalities
in the Commonwealth see BUREAU OF STATISTICS, PENNSYLVANIA STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT 40-45 (10th ed. 1968).
5. Pursuant to the HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT OF 1966, 23 U.S.C § 401-04
(Supp. II, 1965-66), the Secretary of Transportation issued a standard
which requires each state to develop and implement programs designed to
reduce the number of traffic accidents caused by motorists who drive while
under the influence of alcohol. The standard, issued June 26, 1967, re-
quired each state to (1) strengthen their "drunk driving" statutes, (2)
supplement such statutes with "implied consent" authority, and (3) estab-
lish an expanded information collection program to determine the extent
alcohol is present among drivers and adult pedestrians involved in fatal
automobile accidents. H.R. Doc. No. 138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1967).
6. Driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is said
to be any abnormal mental or physical condition which is the result of
consuming intoxicating liquors, and deprives one of the clearness of in-
tellect and control of himself which he would otherwise possess. See, e.g.,
General Assembly approved Senate Bill Number 1413, 7 enacting
what is commonly known as an implied consent statute.8
Because of the application of the implied consent statute to
criminal actions,9 certain constitutional problems may arise. This
Comment will analyze possible constitutional problems that may
develop from the use of the implied consent law in a criminal pros-
ecution for driving while under the influence of liquor. Specif-
ically, the relation of the privilege against self-incrimination and
constitutional warnings under the implied consent law will be ex-
amined.10
Under Pennsylvania's implied consent act, any person who op-
erates a motor vehicle within the Commonwealth is deemed to
have given his consent to a chemical breath test to determine the
Commonwealth v. Mummert, 183 Pa. Super. 638, 133 A.2d 301 (1957);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 174 Pa. Super. 533, 102 A.2d 243 (1954); Common-
wealth v. Long, 131 Pa. Super. 28, 198 A. 474 (1938). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has indicated that it is the condition which makes one un-
fit to drive an automobile or substantially impairs his judgment or any of
the normal faculties deemed essential to safe operation of an auto-
mobile. Commonwealth v. Horn, 395 Pa. 585, 150 A.2d 872 (1959).
7. An act providing that operation of a motor vehicle or tractor in
this Commonwealth shall constitute implied consent to chemical tests to
determine intoxication, authorizing the suspension of operator's licenses
or permits of persons refusing to submit to a chemical test, changing the
percentage of alcohol in the blood which may or may not give rise to
presumptions relating to intoxication; providing for a chemical analysis of
blood in certain cases and authorizing blood and urine tests. Act of April
29, 1959, No. 32, § 624.1, [1959] Pa. Laws 58, title amended July 31, 1968,
No. 237, § 1, [1968] Pa. Laws . PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1 (Supp.
1969), [hereinafter referred to as the Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law].
8. Other states with such statutes are: AaRz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28-691 (Supp. May 1969); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1968);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-30 (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. §
14-227b (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. §
16-1625.1 (Supp. 1968); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 286-151 (1968); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 49-352 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 § 144 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2003c (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.13
(1966); KAN. STAT. ANN § 8-1001 (Supp. 1968); LA. REv. STAT. § 32:661
(Supp. 1970); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (Supp. 1969); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS § 257.625 (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN § 169.123 (Supp.
1969); Mo. REV. STAT. § 564.441 (Supp. 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-727.03
(1968); NH. RE'. STAT. ANN. § 262-A:69(a) (1966); N.J. REV. STAT. §
39:4-50.2 (Supp. 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-22-2.4 (Supp. 1969); N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Sup. 1969); N.C GEN. STAT. § 20-
16.2 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1968); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 47 § 751 (Supp.
1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 483.634 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-2.1
(1969); S.D. CODE § 44.0302-2 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE An. § 41-6-44.10
(Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1188 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5A-1 (Supp. 1969).
9. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1037 (1960). The offense of
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is a misdemeanor,
punishable by a maximum fine of $500, three years imprisonment or both.
10. Other problems which may be encountered are the nature and
the administration of the suspension, prerequisites of a lawful arrest and
the demand for assistance of counsel by a driver. Such problems are be-
yond the scope of this Comment.
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alcoholic content of his blood if the test is administered by quali-
fied personnel" at the direction of a police officer having reason-
able grounds 12 to suspect the motorist of driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. If, after a motorist has been
placed under arrest and charged'8 with driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, he should refuse to submit to a
chemical test of his breath, the test will not be given.' 4 The re-
fusal to submit to a chemical breath test will, however, result in
the suspension of the driver's privilege to operate a motor vehicle
within the Commonwealth. The statute also provides that any
person who is unconscious, dead or otherwise incapable of supplying
sufficient breath for chemical analysis consents to having a physi-
cian, or technician under the direction of a physician, withdraw a
specimen of blood for analysis to determine the level of alcohol
present.1 5
The implied consent act also permits the introduction of the
results of a chemical analysis of a person's blood, breath, or urine
in evidence in a criminal proceeding when the person is charged
with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.16
11. Qualified personnel has been defined to mean police officers or
others who have successfully completed a forty-hour course in chemical
testing equipment for quantitive breath analysis. Such persons may ad-
minister breath tests and analyze the results of such a test. If the device
used is a breath collection device, the operator must complete a six hour
course. Such operators do not determine the alcohol level of the sample
but merely collect it for analysis by a chemist. See DEPT. REv. REG. RTS-
715 (1968) for specific requirements.
12. See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Klinedinst, 82 York Legal Record 198
(C.P., York Co., Pa. 1969) for lack of reasonable cause to suspect a driver
for being under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
13. Courts have indicated that the requirement of "charged" does not
mean a formal charge. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sundstrom, 17 Ches. Co.
Rep. 220, 222 (C.P., Chester Co., Pa. 1969).
14. PA. STAT. An. tit. 75, § 624.1 (a) (Supp. 1969).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1 (f) (Supp 1969).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1 (c) (Supp. 1969). The following
presumptions were established by the act: (1) if the chemical analysis
reveals the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood to be less than 0.05
per cent, the person tested is presumed not to be under the influence of
intoxicating liquor; (2) if the chemical analysis reveals the amount of
alcohol in the blood to be in excess of 0.05 per cent but less than 0.10
per cent, no presumption is created but this fact may be considered with
other competent evidence to determine the guilt or innocence of the person
tested; (3) if the amount of alcohol in the blood is 0.10 per cent or more,
the person tested is presumed to be under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. Under prior legislation the defendant was presumed to be under
the influence of intoxicating liquor if his blood-alcohol level was 0.15 per
cent or more, Act of July 28, 1961, No. 399, [1961] Pa. Laws 918, now PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(c) (Supp. 1969). The lower level of alcohol
by weight required to establish a presumption of being under the influence
In addition, the act changes certain statutory presumptions relat-
ing to the percentage of alcohol by weight in the bloodstream
based on chemical analysis of the blood, breath, or urine.17 Such
chemical analysis does not, however, preclude the introduction of
other competent evidence to establish the intoxicated condition of
the accused motorist.18 The motorist is entitled to receive the re-
sults of any chemical analysis upon request,19 and he may choose
to have additional tests administered by a private physician at the
time of the police tests. 20 If the motorist should fail to submit to a
chemical analysis of his breath, his refusal may also be admitted
into evidence 2 ' in a criminal proceeding for driving while under
the influence.
THEORY OF IMPLIED CONSENT LAWS
The underlying rationale of an implied consent statute is that
a person has only a privilege granted by the state to operate a
motor vehicle upon public highways, not an absolute property
right. The Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that the
motor vehicle operator's license is a mere privilege,2 2 not a prop-
erty right23 or a contract,2 4 which allows its holder a limited right
to use the public highways. The Commonwealth, acting through
the General Assembly, may direct the conditions under which
privilege may be exercised. 25 The license may be revoked by the
issuing authority for due cause 26 such as the failure to exercise a
reasonable degree of safety 27 or other conditions imposed by the
Commonwealth.
2 8
Under the implied consent act,29 a motorist is deemed to have
is in harmony with current scientific and medical opinion See, AMERICAN
MEDICAL AssOCIATION, ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRivER 145-46 (1968).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(c) (Supp. 1969).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624 1(d) (Supp. 1969). Other compe-
tent evidence, "usually accepted as supporting evidence of alcohol intoxi-
cation are the following: (1) odor of the breath, (2) flushed appearance,
(3) lack of muscular coordination, (4) speech difficulties, (5) disorderly
or unusual conduct, (6) mental disturbance, (7) visual disorders, (8) sleep-
iness, (9) muscular tremors, (10) dizziness, and (11) nausea." AMERICAN
MEDICAL AssoCIATION, ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIvER 143-44 (1968).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(e) (Supp. 1969).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(f) (Supp. 1969).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(h) (Supp. 1969).
22. Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (1936).
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408 (1939);
Commonwealth v. Halteman, 192 Pa. Super. 379, 162 A.2d 251 (1960);
Commonwealth v. Harrison, 183 Pa. Super. 133, 130 A.2d 198 (1957).
24. Commonwealth v. Halteman, 192 Pa. Super. 379, 162 A.2d 251
(1960).
25. Id. at 384-85, 162 A.2d at 254-55.
26. Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (1936).
27. Commonwealth v Gassoway, 199 Pa. Super. 479, 185 A.2d 671
(1962).
28. Commonwealth v. Halteman, 192 Pa. Super. 379, 162 A.2d 251
(1960).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(a) (Supp. 1969).
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consented to submit to a chemical test for intoxication after being
arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liq-
uor. Such consent is a condition to the lawful exercise of the
driving privilege, and it is inferred from the operation of a motor
vehicle on the highways.30 The consent extends to all motorists
driving on the public roads of the Commonwealth, not only those
possessing a Pennsylvania operator's license.3 The implied con-
sent is, however, limited to suspension of the driving privilege of
any person who refuses to submit to the chemical test. It does not
operate as a substitute for the actual consent of the motorist to
submit to a test, unless he is incapable of consenting.3 2 Thus, if




SELF-INCRIMINATION: RESULTS OF THE CHEMICAL TEST
Under the Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law34 the results of
a chemical analysis of the motorist's breath or bodily fluids is
admissible in evidence. In other jurisdictions the admission of such
results into evidence has been attacked as being violative of the
accused's privilege against self-incrimination. 3 5 The courts of such
30. Consent is derived in the same manner that a non-resident con-
sents to appointment of a state officer for service of process for any action
arising out of operation of a motor vehicle within the state. The motorist
does not actually consent to such service of process in most instances,
in fact his actual consent is immaterial. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352 (1927).
31. Cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927):
Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; . . . even when skill-
fully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious
dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the
State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to
promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike.
Id. at 356.
32. See, e.g., State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466 (1962):
In spite of the titling, the statutes involved here are not an
implied consent law. Consent to the taking of any of the per-
mitted tests is required to be real, for the respondent has the
privilege of choice. No where does the statute substitute an impli-
cation for an express consent to a test. The inquiry must be
physically put to the respondent. . . . The only implication in-
volved is that one who applies for an operator's license consents
to its suspension if he ever refuses to be tested as the statute pro-
vides.
Id. at 30-31, 179 A.2d at 469.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(a) (Supp. 1969).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(b) (Supp. 1969).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person . . . shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The fifth
amendment was made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
jurisdictions have consistently struck down such contentions, find-
ing that admission of the results of a chemical test is not a violation
of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination because it
does not involve any testimonial compulsion of the defendant.
In Walton v. City of Roanoke,36 the Supreme Court of Virginia
followed the view of Professor Wigmore 7 that the privilege against
self-incrimination is limited to compelling a defendant to give oral
testimony against himself, and does not extend to the use or analy-
sis of a person's bodily secretions. In Walton, the court noted that
the privilege does not extend beyond testimonial compulsion
8
Thus, the taking of blood from the defendant's body, pursuant to
the Virginia implied consent statute39 was not an infringement on
the self-incrimination privilege since the defendant was not com-
pelled to speak to his own detriment.
40
In the landmark case of Schmerber v. California,41 the Su-
preme Court of the United States considered the question of
whether the self-incrimination privilege of the fifth amendment
is violated by the admission of results of a blood test into evidence.
The Court held that the introduction of a compulsory blood test
ment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964):
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion
the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against
federal infringement . . . the right of a person to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence.
Id. at 8.
36. 204 Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315 (1963).
37. Dean Wigmore suggests the self-incrimination privilege prevents
the use of legal process to "extract from the person's own lips" an ad-
mission of guilt which would thus take the place of other evidence. 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 at 378 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis in
original). The Supreme Court indicated that it does not accept or adopt
the Wigmore formulation. See, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763
n.7 (1966).
38. 204 Va. at 682, 133 S.E.2d at 318.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55 (1960).
40. In Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), it was contended that
introduction of evidence that the accused was forced to put on a
blouse which fit him was a violation of the self-incrimination privi-
lege. Mr. Justice Holmes rejected the contention as an extravagent ex-
tension of the fifth amendment:
[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to
be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to exhort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material.
Id. at 252-53.
41. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The case involves the claim of a defendant
convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor that
his privilege against self-incrimination was violated by police when they
directed hospital personnel to extract a sample of the defendant's blood for
the purpose of chemical analysis to determine intoxication. The sample
was removed over defendant's protest and the results of analysis indi-
cated that the defendant was intoxicated. The results of the test were
admitted in evidence at the trial. The Supreme Court held that there was
no violation of the defendant's constitutional rights by the compulsory
blood test and the subsequent admission of the test results.
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into evidence was not violative of petitioner's privilege against self-
incrimination:
42
IT]he privilege protects an accused only from being com-
pelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the
state with evidence of a testimonial nature, . . . the with-
drawal of blood and the use of the analysis ... did not
involve compulsion to these ends.
The Court distinguished between protection of an accused's com-
munications by the self-incrimination privilege and the use of the
accused's body as a source of real or physical evidence,43 which
is not within the fifth amendment purview. 44 Thus, a defendant
may be required to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or
measurements,4 5 and he may be compelled to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to
walk or to make a certain gesture-all without violating the ac-
cused's privilege against self-incrimination.
46
The distinction which has emerged ... is that the privi-
lege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testi-
mony," but that compulsion which makes a suspect the
source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it.
47
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Schmerber,
admitted that the blood test evidence was an incriminating product
of compulsion from petitioner. However, the majority found it was
not the testimony of the petitioner nor evidence relating to testi-
monial or communicative acts by him, therefore the evidence was
not violative of his self-incrimination privilege. 48 The Court's nar-
row construction of the fifth amendment privilege was strongly
criticized by Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion, 49 in which
Mr. Justice Douglas joined. Mr. Justice Black faulted the distinc-
42. Id. at 761.
43. Real evidence is defined as "evidence furnished by things them-
selves, on view or inspection, as distinguished from a description of
them by a mouth of a witness." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY (Rev. 4th ed.
1968).
44. 384 U.S. at 763-64.
45. Id. at 764.
46. Id.; see, e.g., Aaron v. State, 273 Ala. 337, 139 So. 2d 309 (1961);
Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198 P. 288 (1921); Shannon v. State, 207 Ark.
658, 182 S.W.2d 384 (1944); People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal. 2d 105, 194 P.2d 681
(1948); Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126, 300 P.2d 545 (1956); Boyers v. State,
198 Ga. 838, 33 S.E.2d 251 (1945); Lenoir v. State, 197 Md. 495, 80 A.2d 3
(1951); State v. DeCesare, 68 R.I. 32, 26 A.2d 237 (1942).
47. 384 U.S. 757, 764.
48. Id. at 765.
49. Id. at 774 (dissenting opinion). See also, 384 U.S. at 772
(dissenting opinion, Warren, C.J.), 384 U.S. at 779 (dissenting opinion,
Fortas, J.).
tion between real and physical evidence drawn by the majority of
the Court as being "an extraordinary feat," 50 noting the results of
a blood test communicate the fact of guilt to the jury just as cer-
tainly as testimony elicited from the accused. This position was
specifically rejected by the majority of the Court 5' on the basis
that there was no testimonial compulsion involved in securing the
evidence5 2 from petitioner Schmerber.
The Pennsylvania courts have uniformly applied the rationale
of Schmerber.5 3 The self-incrimination privilege operates only to
prevent an accused from being required to incriminate himself by
speech or the equivalent of speech, 4 either at or before trial.5  In
other words, the privilege afforded an accused is a privilege against
testimonial compulsion and no more.56 An accused may be re-
quired to submit to a compulsory mental examination,57 to surren-
der his clothes for analysis,5 8 to submit to a compulsory blood test,50
to speak for the purpose of identification,"0 or to stand up for
identification,0 ' without infringing on his self-incrimination priv-
ilege. The critical distinction is that the accused is not being re-
quired to make any communicative or testimonial act to aid the
prosecution.
In the leading case of Commonwealth v. Musto,62 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court considered the question of whether a com-
50. Id. at 773.
51. Id. at 760, n.5.
52. Id. at 765:
Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or en-
forced communication by the accused was involved either in the
extraction or in the chemical analysis. Petitioner's testimonial
capacities were in no way implicated; . . .his participation, except
as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend
on chemical analysis and on that alone.
53. 384 U.S. 757.
54. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 216 A.2d 50 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 173 A.2d 468 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 945 (1962); Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944);
Commonwealth v. Coroniti, 155 Pa. Super. 131, 38 A.2d 397 (1944); Com-
rnonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950).
55. Commonwealth v. Coroniti, 155 Pa. Super. 131, 38 A.2d 397 (1944).
56. Commonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 582-83, 72 A.2d 688,
691 (1950).
57. Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944), accord,
Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 173 A.2d 468, 471 (1961).
58. Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 216 A.2d 50 (1966).
59. Commonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 582-83, 73 A.2d 688,
690-91 (1950).
60. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 115 Pa. 369, 395, 9 A. 78 (1886).
61. Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 A. 177 (1936).
62. 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944). The case involved the com-
pulsory mental examination of an accused who shot his wife as she left a
courtroom following a divorce proceeding. The district attorney be-
lieved the accused would assert the defense of insanity at trial, and re-
ceived permission of the court to have the defendant examined in prison
by alienists. The defense counsel contended such examination was viola-
tive of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.
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pulsory mental examination violated the accused's privilege not to
incriminate himself and held there was no violation of the privi-
lege. Following the authority of other jurisdictions which had
considered the same issue, 63 the court found:
[T]he constitutional immunity from self-incrimination
does not apply to a compulsory examination to determine
the prisoner's physical or mental condition for .the purpose
of testifying thereto, provided . .. that he not be com-
pelled to answer any questions propounded to him by
those making the examination.
6 4
The court drew the distinction, as did the Supreme Court
twenty-two years later in Schmerber,65 that although the evidence
gained from the accused may be used to incriminate him, it is not
testimonial evidence which the accused is being compelled to
give.'6 Since only testimonial evidence is secure from forcible use
against the accused, the compulsory mental examination violated
no rights of the accused.
The precise question of whether admission of the results of a
blood test in a criminal proceeding is violative of the self-incrim-
ination privilege was considered in Commonwealth v. Tanchyn. 7
The court held that there was no violation of the defendant's self-
incrimination privilege. The court found the removal of blood
from the defendant to be nothing more than the removal of real
evidence68 which was not within the protective purview of the
self-incrimination privilege. Subsequent Pennsylvania decisions
63. The court cited and appeared to rely on cases from other juris-
dictions which held that a forced mental examination violated no constitu-
tional rights of the accused. See, e.g., Waters v. State, 22 Ala. App. 644,
119 So. 248 (1928); People v. Strong, 114 Cal. App. 522, 300 P. 84 (1931);
Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d 1109 (1933); People v. Krauser,
315 fI1. 485, 146 N.E. 593 (1925); Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass.
273, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936); State v. Nelson, 162 Or. 430, 92 P.2d 182 (1939).
64. 348 Pa. 300, 306, 35 A.2d 307, 311 (1944).
65. 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
66. 348 Pa. at 306-07, 35 A.2d at 311. The court adopted the view of
Dean Wigmore:
Not compulsion alone is the component idea of the privilege,
but testimonial compulsion. Unless some attempt is made to se-
cure a communication, written or oral, upon which reliance is to
be placed as influencing a consciousness of the facts and operations
of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him is not
a testimonial one.
Id.
67. 200 Pa. Super. 148, 188 A.2d 824 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
866 (1963). The court held that the unauthorized removal of a blood
sample from arm of defendant, who was hospitalized with injuries sus-
tained in a car accident, and the subsequent introduction of the results of
a blood test into evidence was not violative of the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination.
68. Id. at 158-59, 188 A.2d at 829-30.
have continued to rely on the distinction between physical and
testimonial evidence.0 9
Since the courts and legal writers agree that the application
of the self-incrimination privilege is limited to testimonial evidence,
it is unlikely that the provision of the Pennsylvania Implied Con-
sent Law allowing the results of a chemical analysis of a driver's
blood, breath or urine into evidence at a criminal proceeding will
be found unconstitutional. Since the accused motorist does not
provide the Commonwealth with any testimonial evidence by sub-
mitting to a chemical analysis of his breath or bodily fluids his
privilege against self-incrimination is not violated.
SELF-INCRIMINATION-EVIDENCE OF A DRivER's
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A TEST
The General Assembly has specifically provided that the re-
fusal of a driver to submit to a chemical test of his breath may be
introduced in evidence in a criminal proceeding for driving while
under the influence of liquor.7" The question which arises is
whether the admission of a driver's refusal to submit to a chemical
test into evidence is an unconstitutional infringement on his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Although this precise issue has
not been presented to the appellate courts of the Commonwealth,
it is submitted that the admission of a driver's refusal into evi-
dence is contrary to the self-incrimination doctrine of the state
under existing case authority. This position may be sustained on
either of two grounds: the admission of a person's refusal to sub-
mit into evidence penalizes the accused for exercising his privi-
lege not to submit to the test, and the admission of a person's re-
fusal allows the Commonwealth to use the accused's own testi-
monial evidence against him.
In most instances, the Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law
would be brought into play in the following manner: A law en-
forcement officer observes the erratic driving pattern of a motor-
ist giving the officer reasonable cause to believe the driver is vio-
lating a provision of the Motor Vehicle Code. After pulling the
motorist off to the berm of the highway, the officer may notice
one of the many signs of intoxication present in the motorist.7'1 The
motorist may have a distinct odor of liquor or malt beverages on
69. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512, 246 A.2d 325
(1968).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(h) (Supp. 1969).
71. See, e.g., State v. Corrigan, 4 Conn. Cir. 190, 228 A.2d 568 (1967)
(eyes bloodshot, speech slurred, inability to walk short distance); State v.
Durrant, 188 A.2d 526 (Del. 1963) (driver lost his balance, eyes bloodshot,
odor of alcohol on breath); State v. Heisdorffer, 164 N.W.2d 173 (Iowa
1969) (driver's eyes watery and bloodshot); Walton v. City of Roanoke,




his breath or person, his speech may be slurred and his eyes blood-
shot. At this point, the police officer may ask the suspected
"drunk driver" to perform a field sobriety test, such as picking up
a stone or attempting to walk a straight line. If the officer's sus-
picions are confirmed, the motorist will be placed under arrest and
taken to a police station where he will be asked to submit to a
chemical test of his breath.72 The accused may refuse to submit
or he may refuse to cooperate with the testing officer by not blow-
ing his exhaled air into a testing apparatus.7 3 Upon refusal, the
test may not be lawfully administered. 4 At a subsequent criminal
trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
the motorist's refusal will be introduced, usually by testimony of
the testing officer. The refusal itself will not give rise to any pre-
sumptions, but it may be considered by the trier of fact in deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of the defendant-motorist.
One basis for attacking the introduction of the refusal into
evidence is that the motorist is penalized for exercising a right
specifically permitted under the Pennsylvania Implied Consent
Law. Although there is no existing Pennsylvania authority on this
point, it is submitted that the admission of the driver's refusal
to submit is analogous to the use of a tacit admission 75 of a defend-
ant in a criminal proceeding. Under prior Pennsylvania law
76 it
was permissible to show that a defendant remained silent when
72. In most instances the suspected drunk driver will be brought to a
police station because of the impossibility of having the delicate quantita-
tive breath analysis equipment present in a patrol car. For a description
of the testing equipment used see AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, ALCOHOL
AND THE IMPAIRED DRIvER 105-123 (1968).
73. The distinction between a verbal and a non-verbal refusal would
not be important since the non-verbal communicative act is also protected
by the self-incrimination privilege. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
760 n.5 (1966).
74. PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 75, § 624.1(a) (Supp. 1969).
75. In Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943),
the tacit admission rule was stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania:
The rule of evidence is well established that, when a state-
ment made in the presence and hearing of a person is incriminating
in character and naturally calls for a denial but is not challenged
or contradcted by the accused, although he has opportunity and
liberty to speak, the statement and the fact of his failure to deny
it, are admissible in evidence as an implied admission of the truth
of the charge thus made.
Id. at 421, 32 A.2d at 890.
76. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vento, 410 Pa. 350, 189 A.2d 161 (1963);
Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 398 Pa. 23, 156 A.2d 257 (1959);
Commonwealth v. Shupp, 365 Pa. 439, 75 A.2d 587 (1950); Commonwealth
v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth v. Aston, 227
Pa. 112, 75 A.2d 1019 (1910).
confronted by a third person who offered an incriminating or ac-
cusatory statement. The act of the defendant in failing to deny
the statement was considered to be a tacit admission of his guilt.
The tacit admission rule has been thoroughly repudiated by
the Pennsylvania courts. In Commonwealth ex rel. Shadd v. My-
ers,7 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that the tacit ad-
mission rule had been, in effect, overruled by Miranda v. Arizona:
78
Such evidence is not constitutionally permissible
against an accused in state criminal court trials. There-
fore, previous decisions of this Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, it is now the law that the prosecution may
not use, at trial, evidence that an accused stood mute or
failed to deny incriminating accusations or statements made
in his presence ... the accused may not now be penalized
for exercising his constitutional right to remain silent under
such circumstances.
79
Less than one year later in Commonwealth v. Dravecz,8 o the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the admission of a so-called
tacit admission in a criminal proceeding constituted prejudicial,
reversible error because it infringed on the accused's privilege
against self-incrimination. 8 ' The court reasoned that if a person
has a right to remain silent until or unless he chooses to speak, he
may not suffer any penalty for exercising his right to silence. 82
The rule of tacit admission is fundamentally incompatible with
the right of the defendant not to speak. In effect, although the
accused has a right to remain silent, if he exercises that right in
face of accusatory statements made by a third person, he is held
to have acquiesced to the truth of the statements made to him.
Thus, if the tacit admission of the defendant is shown to the jury,
the accused is thereby prejudiced by doing what he had a legal
right to do.
A request to submit to an intoximeter test does no more than
inferentially accuse a driver of being intoxicated. A refusal to
submit to the test is analogous to an accused's refusal to speak
when confronted with a statement which naturally calls for a de-
nial.8 3 The accused has no duty to deny any statements made to
77. 423 Pa. 82, 223 A.2d 296 (1966).
78. 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). The Pennsylvania court appar-
ently used a footnote in the Miranda opinion as its basis for striking down
the tacit admission rule. For criticisms of the tacit admission rule see:
Note, 112 U. PA. L. Rnv. 210 (1963); Note, 28 U. PiTT. L. REV. 77 (1966).
79. 423 Pa. at 86, 223 A.2d at 229.
80. 424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d 904 (1967).
81. Id. at 586, 227 A.2d at 906.
82. Id. at 584, 227 A.2d at 905.
83. State v. Holt, 156 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Iowa 1968). The Supreme
Court of Iowa used the analogy of a motorist's refusal to submit to a
chemical test to the refusal of a defendant to speak in the face of an
incriminating statement as a basis of supporting its finding that the ad-




him in an investigation or within a courtroom.8 4 In a similar man-
ner the motorist arrested for driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor has no absolute duty to submit to a chemical
test of his breath. The General Assembly has indicated that the
driver must actually consent to a requested test, and if he refuses
to consent, no test may be administered. 85 This gives rise to the
reasonable inference that the General Assembly has granted the
motorist the privilege or power to refuse to submit to the test.86
If the motorist's refusal can be admitted into evidence he is being
penalized for exercising his privilege to refuse to submit to the
chemical test. It is submitted that such evidence is a violation
of the motorist's privilege not to incriminate himself.
Similar reasoning has led the courts of Vermont and New York
to conclude that the introduction of a motorist's refusal to submit
to a test requested under the implied consent laws of their re-
spective states8 7 in a subsequent criminal proceeding is a violation
of the self-incrimination privilege. In State v. Hedding,s8 the issue
of whether the refusal of a motorist to submit to a chemical test
could be introduced in a criminal trial for driving while under the
influence of alcohol was presented to the Supreme Court of Ver-
mont. The court held that the refusal was a privilege granted to
the motorist which could not be compromised by using the refusal
against the driver.8 9 The apparent rationale of the court's conclu-
84. Cf. Commonwealth v. Miller, 205 Pa. Super. 297, 208 A.2d 867
(1965).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(a) (Supp. 1969).
86. The ability to refuse to submit to the test has been described as a
constitutional right, a statutory right, and an absolute right. See, People
v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362 (S. Ct. 1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d
664, 133 N.E.2d 516, 150 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1956); State v. Hedding, 122 Vt. 379,
172 A.2d 599 (1961). A more accurate description would be to describe
the ability as a privilege, since it may not be infringed upon without the
express consent of the motorist.
87. N.Y. VI. & TRAFFic LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1969); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1188 (1967).
88. 122 Vt. 379, 172 A.2d 599 (1961), rev'd on other grounds; accord,
State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 373, 179 A.2d 466 (1962); State v. Muzzy, 122 Vt. 222,
202 A.2d 267 (1964).
89. State v. Hedding, 122 Vt. 379, 172 A.2d 599 (1961):
By refusing this test the respondent did what he had an
absolute right to do, which was the intent of the legislature in
enacting the statute ... By allowing evidence to come into a
case of such refusal to take the test, and by the Court then
instructing the jury on such evidence of refusal, a respondent might
well be condemned by inference for exercising a right given him
under the law.
Id. at 382, 172 A.2d at 601. The court however did not consider the ad-
mission of the evidence of refusal to be error, since the defense counsel
failed to object to its inclusion. The same contention was also raised in
sion was based on the statutory language which prohibited admis-
sion of the test over the refusal of the accused.9° In People v.
Stratton,9 a New York court held that admission of a motorist's
refusal to take an intoximeter test was analogous to evidence of
his silence in the face of an accusatory statement and could not be
admitted without violating the accused's privilege against self-in-
crimination.9 2 The court acknowledged that results of a blood test
could be introduced into evidence to show the alcoholic content
of the blood but found the legislature "has also recognized a per-
son's right to refuse the test."
9 3
A final observation should be made of the statutes involved
in the Hedding and Stratton cases. Both implied consent statutes
contained substantially similar language to the Pennsylvania Im-
plied Consent Law. 4 None of the statutes contain language giving
a motorist an express right to refuse a requested chemical test,
but because of the language prohibiting the forced admission of
the test over the refusal of a motorist, a strong inference is raised
that the enacting authority granted the motorist the privilege of
not submitting to a requested sobriety test. Such reasoning would
appear to be the rationale used by the Hedding and Stratton courts
to sustain their findings that a motorist's refusal to submit to a
sobriety test cannot be introduced into evidence without infringing
on the accused's privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, if
the Pennsylvania courts follow the theory of the New York and
Vermont courts, a motorist will be deemed to have the privilege
not to submit to a requested test and the introduction of his re-
fusal into evidence will be deemed a violation of his privilege
against self-incrimination.
It could be argued, however, that evidence of a motorist's re-
fusal should be admitted into evidence because the motorist has
no constitutional right to refuse to submit to the requested test or
the refusal to submit is indicative of a consciousness of guilt on
the part of the accused. The courts of several jurisdictions have
manifested a willingness to follow this rationale and in doing so
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966). There, however,
counsel contended that the introduction of the petitioner's refusal was a
ground for reversal under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The
Supreme Court refused to consider the argument because defense counsel
had failed to object to the introduction of petitioner's attempted refusal.
However, the Court indicated that "general Fifth Amendment principles
would control" rather than the specific holding of Griffin. 384 U.S. 757,
765.
90. See, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1188 (1967).
91. 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362 (S. Ct. 1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d
664, 133 N.E.2d 516, 150 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1956).
92. Id. at 326, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
93. Id.
94. Compare N.Y. Vm. & TR mc LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp.
1969) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(a) (Supp. 1969) and VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23 § 1188 (1967).
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have found that admission of evidence of a refusal to submit to a
chemical test is not violative of the fifth amendment privilege."
A leading case supporting this view is State v. Kenderski.96
The Superior Court of New Jersey held that a person suspected of
driving while intoxicated had no legal right to refuse to take the
breathalyzer test; therefore, it was not necessary to allow the
driver to consult with counsel. Although the court was not faced
with the admission into evidence of a driver's refusal to take the
test, the holding can be said to represent the basic proposition that
a driver has no right to refuse the test. Therefore, comment on a
refusal to submit would not be prohibited since no right of the
accused has been compromised.
The Kenderski case is subject to two criticisms. First, the
court found that the driver had no right to refuse the test even
though the New Jersey implied consent law expressly prohibits the
forced administration of a sobriety test over the refusal of a driver 7
The court also found that the defendant had consented to be tested
by his very act of driving on the roadY5 Such reasoning ignores
the basic distinction of the implied consent statute itself-the motor-
ist is given an option. He may submit to the test or he may refuse to
submit. His failure to submit will result in the suspension of his
operator's license-but that should be the extent of consequences
of his refusal.
The courts of California have also held that a driver has no
constitutional right to refuse to submit to a breath test. In People
v. Sudduth99 the Supreme Court of California rejected the theory
95. See, e.g., Finley v. Orr, 262 Cal. App. 656, 69 Cal. Rptr. 137
(1968); State v. Durrant, 188 A.2d 526 (Del. 1963); State v. Holt, 156 N.W.2d
884 (Iowa 1968); State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968); State
v. Kenderski, 99 N.J. Super. 224, 239 A.2d 249 (1968); City of Westerville
v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968); State v. Stanton,
15 Ohio St. 215, 239 N.E.2d 92 (1968).
96. 99 N.J. Super. 224, 239 A.2d 249 (1968). The defendant was
observed driving recklessly. After being pulled to the side of the road by
police, the defendant was arrested for driving while under the influence.
The defendant submitted to a breath test, and was convicted for driving
while under the influence. On appeal defendant contended that he should
have been advised of his right to counsel before being required to submit
to the test.
97. N.J. REv. STAT. § 39:4-50.2 (Supp. 1968).
98. 99 N.J. Super, at 229, 239 A.2d at 252.
99. 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966). Defendant
Louis E. Sudduth was convicted of driving while under the influence of
liquor. On appeal defendant Sudduth claimed that his constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination had been violated in permitting the intro-
duction of his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test following his arrest
into evidence. The Supreme Court of California rejected defendant Sud-
duth's contention. The court based its reasoning on People v. Ellis, 65
that comment on a driver's refusal to submit to a chemical test was
a violation of the fifth amendment since the defendant had no
right to refuse. The court found chemical testing to be analogous
to fingerprinting, voiceprinting and the like.10 0 It is submitted
that the decision of Sudduth is not applicable to the Pennsylvania
Implied Consent Law. Under the existing California law there is
no reasonable inference that a motorist has the privilege to refuse
to submit, nor is forcible administration of a test prohibited.' 0'
The existence of the option to refuse under the Pennsylvania Im-
plied Consent Law clearly distinguishes the situation from one
where the defendant may be required to do certain acts or submit
to testing.10 2 In such instances the defendant simply does not have
any option to refuse He has not been granted any privilege to do
so by the legislature or the courts.
Another basis of objection is the belief that a refusal to submit
to a chemical test is indicative of a consciousness of guilt by the
accused. 103 This belief is clearly based on the premise that a guilty
man will refuse to take the test because of his fear of the results
while his innocent brethren would unhesitantly submit. The
sweeping application of this belief as a rule of human behavior is
subject to the same criticism as the fundamental precepts of the
tacit admission rule.1 0 4 Since Pennsylvania courts will not permit
tacit admissions to be introduced into evidence, it appears unlikely
that they would find a refusal to submit to a test to be a necessary
manifestation of guilt.
Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966), decided the same day
as defendant Sudduth's case. In People v. Ellis, the court had rejected
the contention that evidence of a refusal to submit to voice printing is
volative of the self-incrimination privilege. It found specifically that the
defendant had no right to refuse to speak for voice identification. Such
conduct in refusing to submit to the voice printing was equated with a
consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant. The consciousness of
guilt was not a testimonial communication so it was not protected by the
fifth amendment, according to the court.
100. See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr.
385 (1966).
101. Compare CALIF. VER. CODE § 13353(a) (West. Supp. 1968) with
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(a) (Supp. 1969).
102. See discussion, supra p. 226 supra.
103. City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N.E.2d
40 (1968):
Where a defendant is being accused of intoxication and is
not intoxicated, the taking of a reasonably reliable chemical test
for intoxication should establish that he is not intoxicated ...
if he is intoxicated, the taking of such a test will probably establish
that he is intoxicated . . . it is reasonable to infer that a refusal
to take such a test indicates the defendant's fear of the result of the
test and his consciousness of guilt.
Id. at 122, 239 N.E.2d at 41.
104. There may be a number of reasons why a motorist may not want
to take a breath or blood test. He may not understand the mechanics of
the test, or may feel that the test is an unconstitutional violation of his
rights. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sundstrom, Misc. No. 12981 (C.P.
Chester Co., Pa. 1969).
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A third argument used to support admission of a motorist's
refusal to submit to a test is that since the results of a chemical
test are admissible without violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination, a fortiori, a refusal to submit to the test may also
be admitted without violating the privilege. This reasoning, al-
though used by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. Du-
gas,10 5 ignores the distinction between the results of a valid chem-
ical test designed to measure the level of alcohol in a person's blood
and a refusal to submit to such a test. It does not necessarily
follow that the refusal to submit to the test should be allowed into
evidence because the results of the test itself may be admitted
into evidence. If the Pennsylvania courts would follow the ra-
tionale of Dugas, they would circumvent the issue without consid-
ering it.
A final reason for finding an admission of a driver's refusal
into evidence to be violative of the self-incrimination privilege may
be found in the history of this privilege in Pennsylvania. The
weight of authority indicates that a refusal to submit to a chemical
test is a testimonial communication by the accused in response
to a question by the police. The motorist may be asked, "Will
you submit to a chemical test of your breath?". Although his re-
sponse may be a negative reply, total silence, or some equivocal,
evasive answer, it will be an answer to a question. Under Penn-
sylvania authority such an answer will be protected by the privi-
lege against self-incrimination because the accused is not required
to incriminate himself by speech or the equivalent of speech.100
105. 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968). The case involved the claim
of Alan L. Dugas that the admission of his refusal to submit to an intoxi-
meter test into evidence was violative of his rights against self-incrimina-
tion under the fifth amendment. The defendant was convicted of negligent
homicide arising from a fatal automobile collision. The court found no
violations of the defendant's right against self-incrimination. The case
may be distinguished, however, in that the defendant elected to testify
at the trial about refusing to take the test, thus, foreclosing any complaint
of the state's testimony of his refusal to take the test.
106. Cf. Commonwealth v. Valeroso, 273 Pa. 213, 116 A. 828 (1922).
In a murder prosecution, the district attorney called on the defedant in
open court to produce a letter written to him so that it could be entered into
evidence as proof of defendant's motive for the killing. The court rejected
the district attorney's actions. Although a defendant can be compelled to
exhibit himself for identification or comparison,
[n]evertheless the uniform principle recognized in all [juris-
dictions] is that he cannot be required by speech or equivalent
of speech to criminate himself. In the instant case the principle
applies, because on the call for the letter, he was bound to speak
or remain silent, and his silence was the equivalent of speech.
Id. at 219-220, 116 A. at 829.
The appellant courts of Pennsylvania have consistently held
that a defendant may be required to submit to an examination of
his person or mind without violating his privilege against self-
incrimination because the results of such an examination would
be real or physical evidence not protected by the self-incrimination
privilege.10 7 But the courts have also held that the defendant
cannot be compelled to answer any questions in such examination
if the answers were to be used as a basis for showing the defend-
ant's "consciousness of the facts and the operations of his mind in
expressing it."1o8 For instance, the police may ask the defendant
questions for the purpose of listening to his speech pattern to de-
termine if it is slurred in the same manner that a psychiatrist may
determine the personal characteristics and behavior of an accused
murderer through testing and interviewing'0 9 without violating
the self-incrimination privilege. However, if the defendant is sub-
jected to a compulsory oral examination for the purpose of eliciting
information of a testimonial or communicative nature, such infor-
mation is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination." 1
It is submitted that the refusal of a person to submit to the chemi-
cal test is the type of information received by the police which
cannot be used in evidence without violating the self-incrimination
privilege of the accused.'
107. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944);
Commonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950).
108. Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944).
109. Id.
110. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966). The Su-
preme Court indicated unequivocally that the fifth amendment privilege
protected "an accused's communications whatever form they might take
and the compulsion of responses which are also communications." Id. In
a caveat, 384 U.S. at 765, n.9, the court noted that if a person is compelled
to submit to a test designed to produce physical evidence, and he utters
some incriminating statement rather than submit to the test, the state-
ment may be considered testimonial by-product of the test. Characterizing
such evidence as an unavoidable product of the compulsion to submit
to the test, the court found such evidence would be protected by the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. In Gay v. Orlando, 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla.
App. 1967), the refusal to submit to a chemical test for intoxication was
held to be a testimonial by-product protected by the fifth amendment.
The position has been criticized as a too liberal view of the Schmerber
footnote. See State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d 416 (Fla. App. 1969); City of
Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968). The
Supreme Court appears to be concerned with protecting the accused, who
on grounds of fear or religious belief, would make an incriminating state-
ment when faced with the prospect of blood extraction. The decision of
Gay would seem to be an unwarranted extension of the testimonial by-
product theory.
111. The constitutional problem may be avoided, however, by requir-
ing the arresting officer to inform the drunk driver of the consequences
of a refusal to submit to a requested test. For instance a driver may be
informed as follows: "You are requested to submit to a chemical test of
your breath to determine the alcoholic content of your blood. You have a
choice of whether it will be of your breath, blood or urine. If you refuse
to submit to the test it will not be given. A refusal will, however, result




The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law does not contain any
provisions for warnings to be given a motorist before he is re-
quested to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. Thus, the
problem arises of whether or not the driver must be informed of
his four-fold warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona.
112
Initially, it would appear that the suspected drunk driver is
required to have the Miranda warnings administered to him. In
most instances after being pulled over to the side of the road the
suspected drunk driver will be submitted to a series of questions,
initiated by the police officer. Thus, the driver, after having his
freedom of movement stopped will be asked a series of questions,
and apparently the prerequisites of administering the Miranda
warnings will be established.113 However, most jurisdictions ap-
pear to reject contentions that Miranda warnings must be admin-
istered.114 The Pennsylvania courts have not passed on the precise
Your refusal may also be admitted into evidence in a criminal prose-
cution."
If such a warning were administred to a driver, he would have the
ability to make a knowing and intelligent decision as to whether or not
to submit to the test. If he decides not to submit to the test he will be
aware of the consequences. Several jurisdictions specifically require such
warnings, either by statute or judicial decisions. See, e.g., Virgin Islands
v. Quinones, 301 F. Supp. 246 (D.C. Virgin Islands 1969) (construing the
Virgin Island Implied Consent Law, V.I. CODE tit. 20, § 493(d) to require
a driver be warned that he has a right to refuse the test); OaE. RaV. STAT.
§ 483.634(2) (1968) (statutory requirement).
112. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Miranda requires (1) that a suspect un-
dergoing custodial interrogation be informed that he has the right to remain
silent, (2) that anything he says can be used against him in court, (3) that
he has the right to consult with an attorney of his own choice and to have
that attorney present while he answers questions, and (4) that if he is
unable to afford an attorney one will be provided for him. See Com-
monwealth v. Learning, 432 Pa. 326, 247 A.2d 590 (1968).
113. Miranda warnings are required to be given when a suspect is
undergoing custodial interrogation, which is defined as "questioning ini-
tiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 384 U.S. at 444. See also Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405,
247 A.2d 612 (1968); Commonwealth v. Leaming, 432 Pa. 326, 247 A.2d 590
(1968).
114. See, e.g., State v. Corrigan, 4 Conn. Cir. 190, 228 A.2d 568 (1967);
State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968); People v. Mulack, 40 Ill. 2d 429,
240 N.E.2d 633 (1968); State v. Heisdorffor, 164 N.W.2d 173 (Iowa 1969);
State v. Kenderski, 99 N.J. Super. 224, 239 A.2d 249 (1968) ; People v. Giela-
rowski, 58 Misc. 2d 832, 296 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Dist. Ct. 1968); City of Colum-
bus v. Hayes, 9 Ohio App. 2d 38, 222 N.E.2d 329 (1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 941 (1967). Contra, People v. McLaren, 55 Misc. 2d 676, 285 N.Y.S.2d
991 (Dist. Ct. 1967), where a motion to suppress the results of a perform-
ance test was granted because the police failed to inform a suspected
"drunk driver" of his constitutional rights.
issue of whether or not the constitutional warnings are required in
a driving while under the influence of alcohol offense.
A primary argument used to sustain the view that the warn-
ings are not required is that they need not be administered in a
traffic violation offense situation. In State v. Bliss,115 the Supreme
Court of Delaware held that police arresting a motorist for driving
while under the influence of alcohol were not required to admin-
ister the Miranda warnings because such warnings were not appli-
cable to motor vehicle offenses. The court pointed to the sheer
volume of traffic offenses committed each year as a practical reason
for not requiring Miranda warnings be given.116 It could be con-
tended, however, that since Miranda is applicable to all criminal
trials after June 13, 1966,117 it would, by definition, be applicable
to a driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor trial.
Such an argument could be refuted by showing that the ac-
cused motorist was not undergoing any custodial interrogation' 18
but was merely undergoing a general on-the-scene questioning
which did not require warnings be given. 119 In the situation when
the motorist has been stopped and questioned concerning his erratic
driving behavior, it could be argued that the police are attempting
to determine if the driver is intoxicated, ill or just reckless.' 20
If the police then believe the motorist to be intoxicated it could
be argued that since the focus of the police investigation is upon
the driver as the perpetrator of a crime, the driver should be given
the warnings.121 However, this argument may be rejected on the
theory that even if the focus of the investigation is upon the driver,
he is not being subjected to an interrogation designed to produce
testimonial evidence, but only real or physical evidence in the
form of a breath or blood test.
122
115. 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968).
116. Id. at 850.
117. Commonwealth v. Learning, 432 Pa. 326, 331, 247 A.2d 590, 593
(1968).
118. See note 112 supra.
119. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966):
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional func-
tion of police officers in investigating crime .... General on-the-
scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general
questioning of citizens in fact finding process is not affected by
our holding.
Id. at 477-78.
120. State v. Corrigan, 4 Conn. Cir. 190, 228 A.2d 568, 571 (1967).
121. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612
(1968).
122. State v. Kenderski, 99 N.J. Super. 224, 239 A.2d 249 (1968):
Defendant argues that breatholizer evidence is subject to the
Miranda rule, but this is clearly not the law. Miranda is bottomed
on the privilege against self-incrimination and bans the use of
communications of or by the subject. Rather, it is a search of the
person and therefore, subject only to the question of reasonable-
ness.
Id. at 228, 239 A.2d at 251.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Although some of the original salient features 23 of Miranda
have been expanded, there is one element that remains essential,
"self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitu-
tional rights."' 2 4 As viewed by some courts the accused motorist
does not have to be informed of his rights because he is not giving
testimonial evidence. There is nothing to attach the procedural
safeguards of Miranda upon.125 It would appear likely that the
Pennsylvania courts will not require Miranda warnings since the
defendant is only being required to produce physical evidence. 26
CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law represents a manifest
effort by the General Assembly to curb the abuses of the drunk
driver on the highways of the Commonwealth. The benefits of
such an act must, however, be tempered by the constitutional
rights of an accused in a criminal proceeding. Although there is
little doubt that the results of a reliable chemical test to determine
intoxication may be introduced into evidence without violating the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the provision
of this law allowing introduction of a driver's refusal must be chal-
lenged as an infringement on the self-incrimination privilege.
By inference, a motorist is granted the privilege of refusing
to submit to a chemical test. If, at a subsequent criminal trial,
the refusal is admitted into evidence, the motorist will be con-
demned by exercising his right not to submit to the test. The situ-
ation is analogous to the tacit admission doctrine which is no
longer used in the Commonwealth because it was found violative
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). The original salient
features were incommunicado interrogation within a police-dominated
atmosphere resulting in the production of self-incriminating statements
from the accused. But see Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 230 (1969) (warnings
needed when defendant questioned in his own bedroom); Common-
wealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d 464 (1969) (warnings must be
given to accused who walked into police station and told police he was
murder suspect they were seeking, before police could elicit any details from
the accused).
124. 384 U.S. at 445.
125. State v. Corrigan, 4 Conn. Cir. 190, 194, 228 A.2d 568, 571 (1967).
126. See, State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d 848 (Del. 1968), where the court
found it could not be considered prejudicial error to fail to warn a sus-
pected drunk driver because he was not entitled to any warnings but the
court added in a footnote:
The police are advised to give this warning rather than rely
on a future lack of prejudice. It is easily given, and if given,
forestalls delays of cases in instances like the present case.
Id. at 850 n.l.
of the self-incrimination privilege. In both instances the person
is being penalized for doing what he had a right to do. The admis-
sion of a motorist's refusal also appears to be violative of existing
Pennsylvania law on self-incrimination.
It is submitted that the provision of the Pennsylvania Implied
Consent Law allowing the admission of a person's refusal to submit
to a chemical test for intoxication into evidence is an unconstitu-
tional infringement on his privilege against self-incrimination. 127
Under the theory that the chemical tests are designed only to pro-
duce physical or real evidence it is submitted that Miranda warn-
ings are not required, although fewer problems would result if the
constitutional warnings were administered. 128
ROBERT P. BARBAROWICZ
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624.1(h) (Supp. 1969). At least one
lower court to pass on the validity of the section has found it constitutional.
See Commonwealth v. Bebout, No. 89 of 1969, Crim. Div., C.P. Beaver Co.
Pa., decided Sept. 22, 1969 (Reed, P.J.O.C. Div. specially presiding), appeal
filed, (Pa. Super. Oct. 31, 1969) (No. 58 April Term 1970).
128. The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently rejected any distinc-
tion on not warning a defendant in a misdemeanor offense. See, Com-
monwealth v. Bonser, 215 Pa. Super. 452, 258 A.2d 675 (1969) (defendant
charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol entitled to
Miranda warnings when undergoing custodial interrogation).
